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ABSTRACT
Recent research has shown Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples that induce desired misclassifications in the models. Such risks impede the application
of machine learning in security-sensitive domains. Several defense methods have been proposed
against adversarial attacks to detect adversarial examples at test time or to make machine learning
models more robust. However, while existing methods are quite effective under blackbox threat
model, where the attacker is not aware of the defense, they are relatively ineffective under whitebox
threat model, where the attacker has full knowledge of the defense.
In this thesis, we propose ExAD, a framework to detect adversarial examples using an en-
semble of explanation techniques. Each explanation technique in ExAD produces an explanation
map identifying the relevance of input variables for the model’s classification. For every class in
a dataset, the system includes a detector network, corresponding to each explanation technique,
which is trained to distinguish between normal and abnormal explanation maps. At test time, if
the explanation map of an input is detected as abnormal by any detector model of the classified
class, then we consider the input to be an adversarial example. We evaluate our approach using
six state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on three image datasets. Our extensive evaluation shows
that our mechanism can effectively detect these attacks under blackbox threat model with limited
false-positives. Furthermore, we find that our approach achieves promising results in limiting the
success rate of whitebox attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being increasingly adopted in a wide range
of tasks such as face-recognition [4], natural language processing [5], and malware classification
[6]. This trend can be attributed to the superior performance achieved by DNNs in solving com-
putational tasks that rely on high-dimensional data. However, increasing adoption of DNNs to
security-critical applications, such as self-driving cars and malware classification, is hindered by
the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial attacks [7, 8, 9, 10]. Specifically, minor yet carefully
computed perturbations to natural inputs can cause DNNs to misclassify.
Several methods have been proposed for defending against adversarial examples. One direction
of research is to improve the robustness of neural networks, such as through adversarial training
[9] or gradient masking [11]. However, subsequent works have shown that neural network archi-
tectures modified with such techniques can still be attacked [12]. Another research direction is
adversarial detection, where the goal is to detect if an input is an adversarial example or a normal
example. Early works in this area either used a second neural network [13, 14, 15], or statisti-
cal tests [16, 17, 18] to classify between normal and adversarial examples. However, Carlini et
al. [19] showed that while most of these mechanisms are successful against blackbox attacks, they
lack robustness to whitebox attacks, where the adversary has knowledge of the defense. Although
many recent methods have enhanced the detection of blackbox adversarial attacks [1, 20, 2, 3],
improving the robustness to whitebox attacks remains an open problem.
One way of uncovering the reasons for the resulting misclassification of an adversarial example
can be understanding why the model predicts what it predicts through explanation techniques [21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. For an image input, the result from an explanation technique encodes the
relevance of each pixel for the prediction result and is commonly referred to as an explanation map.
Our hypothesis is that the explanation map of an adversarial example being misclassified as the
target class may not be consistent with explanation maps generated for correctly classified normal
examples of that class. We term the former type as abnormal explanations and the latter as normal
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Figure 1.1: Intuition behind the proposed ExAD framework.
explanations throughout this paper. Figure 1.1 shows an intuitive example where we can observe
that the explanation map of an adversarial example classified into the shirt class (bottom-right) is
quite distinguishable from that of a normal example of the targeted class (bottom-left). Overall,
the distinguishability between normal and abnormal explanation maps guides us in exploring the
effectiveness of using explainability as a tool for detecting adversarial examples.
However, a defense method that relies on a single explanation technique may still not be ro-
bust under whitebox setting. An adaptive adversary can leverage recent findings which show that
explanations can be unreliable [29] and can be manipulated to produce a target explanation map
[30, 31]. Such an adaptive adversary can generate adversarial examples that not only fool the target
model into producing desired misclassifications, but also fool the targeted explanation technique
into producing normal explanation maps. Towards building a mitigation strategy, we take motiva-
tion from previous work on N-variant systems [32]. To provide higher resistance against attacks
on software vulnerabilities, these systems combine multiple variants with disjoint exploitation sets
into a single system. In context of our work, we propose to use an ensemble of multiple kinds of
explanation techniques. The benefit of this approach is that it requires an adaptive adversary to
construct an adversarial example that fools the target model and simultaneously fools all explana-
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tion techniques. By incorporating diverse explanation techniques, we can reduce the probability
that an attacker will achieve this goal.
In this thesis, using the above insights, we propose ExAD, an Ensemble approach for Explanation-
based Adversarial Detection. ExAD uses an ensemble of explanation techniques wherein each
technique provides an explanation map for every classification decision by a target model. To in-
troduce explanation diversity, we include both gradient-based [21, 22, 33, 24, 23] and propagation-
based [26, 27, 23] explanation techniques in ExAD. Furthermore, for any class in a dataset, the
system includes a detector model associated with each explanation technique. The detector model
determines if an explanation map produced by the respective explanation technique is normal or
not for that class. The key idea here is to use the distinguishability between normal and abnormal
explanations for any class. Finally, for a test input classified into a particular class, if the explana-
tion map produced by any technique is detected as abnormal by the corresponding detector model,
then we classify the input as an adversarial example.
To assess the effectiveness of ExAD, we evaluate it using six state-of-the-art adversarial attacks
on three image datasets, namely MNIST [34], Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST) [35] and CIFAR-10
[36]. We first perform the evaluation under the blackbox threat model. Our experimental results
show that we can effectively detect all attacks, achieving a detection rate above 98% (many having
100% detection rate) across the three datasets with a low false-positive rate of under 1.1%. We
also compare ExAD with three state-of-the-arts Magnet [1], Feature Squeezing [2], and LID [3].
Our results show that ExAD can consistently achieve high detection rates with low false-positive
rates, while state-of-the-art systems perform very well only on a subset of attacks or datasets.
More importantly, we further evaluate ExAD under whitebox threat model. We build on previ-
ous research [31, 30], and create a strong adaptive adversary to generate adversarial examples that
fool the target model as well as a target explanation technique. Through experimental results, we
make an interesting finding on the transferability of adaptive attacks on explanation-based detector
models. We observe that on targeting a propagation-based technique, the resulting adversarial ex-
amples are more successful in fooling detector models of other propagation-based techniques (into
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misclassifying an explanation map as normal) as compared to fooling detector models of gradient-
based techniques. Likewise, we find that targeting a gradient-based technique transfers better to
the detector model of the other gradient-based technique compared to those of propagation-based
techniques. Using an ensemble of detector models corresponding to diverse techniques, ExAD
achieves a mean detection rate of over 88% for this whitebox attack across the three datasets. The
results indicate that our proposed defense can significantly limit the success rate of such whitebox
attacks. Additionally, we find that our ensemble approach makes it considerably harder for attack-
ers to perform more advanced whitebox attacks, such as simultaneously targeting all explanation
techniques.
4
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Neural networks
A DNN is a computational graph of elementary computing units, called neurons, organized into
layers that represent the extraction of successive representations from the input. We use notations
consistent with previous work [20, 19] to denote an m-class DNN as a function f : Rd → Rm.
Each layer of the network takes as input the result from the previous layer. Neurons in adjacent
layers are connected with links that have associated weights and biases. Some layers involve an
activation function such as the non-linear ReLU [37]. Thus, the i-th layer of the network computes
f i(x) = ReLU(W if i−1(x) + bi)
where W i is a weight matrix, bi is a vector of bias values, and ReLU is a non-linear activation
function. Let Z(x) denote a vector of m elements representing the output of the last layer (before
softmax), known as logits, i.e., Z(x) = fn(x). A softmax function is used to obtain the normalized
output of the network given by y = f(x) = softmax(Z(x)) where x ∈ Rd and y ∈ Rm with
yi representing the probability of the input being recognized as class i. Then, we represent the
classification of f(·) on x by
C(x) = argmaxi(f(x)i)
At test-time, a trained model is provided with test inputs Xt, and for each input xt ∈ Xt, the model
assigns its classification to be C(xt) = argmaxi(f(xt)i). The result is considered correct if the
classification C(xt) is same as the true label C∗(xt).
2.2 Adversarial examples
Adversarial examples are crafted by imperceptibly perturbing normal inputs to cause DNNs
into misclassifying them. Formally, an input to the classifier f(·) is termed as normal if it occurs
naturally [1] or was benignly created [19]. Then, given a normal input x ∈ Rd with correctly
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classified class C(x) = c, we call x′ an (untargeted) adversarial example if it is close to x, i.e.,
∆(x, x′) < ε and C(x′) 6= c, where ∆(.) denotes a measure of similarity between two inputs and
ε is a threshold that limits the permissible perturbations in the adversarial example. In a more
restrictive case, an attacker could also target a desired class t 6= c and find a x′ close to x such that
C(x) = c and C(x′) = t. We call x′ a targeted adversarial example.
In the case of images, the closeness function ∆(.) and threshold ε should be chosen such that
the adversarial example and its seed image (normal counterpart) are indistinguishable to a human







Common choices for Lp include: L0, a measure of the number of pixels which have different values
in corresponding positions in two images; L2, which measures the standard Euclidean distance; or
L∞, a measure of the maximum change among all pixels at corresponding places in two images.
2.3 Existing attacks
Researchers have developed a number of methods for constructing adversarial examples. Broadly,
these methods can be categorized into gradient-based attacks [12, 9, 7], which leverage gradient-
based optimizations, and content-based attacks [38, 39], where perturbations are made in accor-
dance with the semantics of the input content to simulate real-world scenarios. In this paper, we
focus on six state-of-the-art gradient-based attacks for neural network classifiers, namely Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [8], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [40], Momentum Iterative
Method (MIM) [41], and Carlini and Wagner Attacks (CW) [12] tailored to L0, L2, and L∞ norms.
2.3.1 Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
Papernot et al. proposed the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [8], which is a
greedy algorithm that optimizes the L0 distance. The attack is carried out in an iterative process.
In each iteration, the attack first computes the Jacobian, i.e., the forward derivative of a DNN.
Next, it generates an adversarial saliency map which is used to measure the degree to which each
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output class label will be impacted when individual pixels are modified by using the Jacobian
matrix. Then, the most relevant pixel is perturbed to obtain the highest benefit towards getting
the model to misclassify the adversarial example. Finally, the iterative process concludes when
an adversarial example is found or if the adversarial threshold is exceeded. While JSMA only
modifies a small number of pixels, it has a very high computational cost as it involves computing
the Jacobian matrix, making it impractical for high dimensional inputs.
2.3.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
Goodfellow et al. proposed the fast gradient sign method [9] to generate adversarial examples.
For a normal example x, FGSM changes all the pixels simultaneously with the same magnitude
along the gradient direction and finds an adversarial example x′ in the L∞ neighborhood of x. The
gradient sign is computed using backpropagation and is quite fast. This makes FGSM an efficient
attack algorithm. Formally, FGSM attack generates an adversarial example using the following
equation:
x′ = x+ ε · sign(OxJ(f(x)))
where O represents the gradient, J(·) is the loss function used to train the model F (·), and ε is a
parameter chosen to be sufficiently small for the adversarial example to be hard to detect.
2.3.3 Basic Iterative Method (BIM):
Kurakin et al. extended the FGSM attack using an iterative optimization method [40]. For a
normal example x, in each iteration, the attack applies the fast gradient sign method with a small
step size, and clips pixel values of intermediate results after each step to ensure that they are in an
L∞ neighbourhood of the original example x. Formally, BIM performs the following update in the
Nth iteration:
xadvN = Clipx,ε =
{
xadvN−1 + α · sign(OxJ(xadvN−1, ytrue))
}
where xadv0 is the original correctly classified input and α is the step-size.
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2.3.4 Carlini and Wagner Attack (CW):
Carlini and Wagner proposed three attack algorithms tailored to different Lp norms, namely,
L2, L0, and L∞. Following notations in a previous work [20], we refer to these attacks as CW2,
CW0, and CW∞ respectively. With the distance metric instantiated with a particular Lp norm, the
overall attack approach can be formalized as the following optimization problem. Given original
example x, find perturbation δ that solves
minimize ‖δ‖p + α · f(x+ δ)
such that x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
where f(.) is an objective function such that C(x + δ) 6= C∗(x)), i.e., the classifier makes a
misclassification, if and only if f(x+ δ) ≤ 0, and α > 0 is a hyperparameter.
The attack algorithm ensures the adversarial modification results in a valid example, i.e., 0 ≤





(tanh(wi) + 1)− xi
Since −1 ≤ tanh(wi) ≤ 1, it can be seen that 0 ≤ xi + δi ≤ 1, and therefore the resulting
adversarial example will be valid.
2.3.5 Momentum Iterative Method (MIM)
Dong et al. built upon the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) with an added momentum term
and proposed the Momentum Iterative Method (MIM). The technique accelerates gradient descent
based attack algorithms by accumulating a velocity vector in the direction of the gradient of the
loss function across iterations. For targeted attacks, the Momentum Iterative Method is formally
represented as:







xtadv − α · Clip[−2,2](round(gt+1))
)
where g0 = 0, x0adv = x, α =
ε
T
with T being the number of iterations, std(•) is the standard
deviation and round(•) is rounding to nearest integer.
2.4 Existing work on adversarial detection
Adversarial detection is a defense approach with the goal of building a classifier g with a binary
output y ∈ {0, 1}, where labels 0 and 1 denote that the input instance is normal or adversarial,
respectively. We briefly review state-of-the-art works in detecting adversarial examples, and divide
them into three categories as below.
Training a Detector. First, we can use adversarial examples to train detectors. The input into
detectors can be chosen as data instances in raw feature space or the intermediate representation
space of the target model. Using the former strategy, Gong et al. show that a simple binary
classifier can learn to separate normal and adversarial instances [13]. In a related work, Grosse
et al. add a new class, solely for adversarial examples, in the output layer of the model [14].
But, modifying the model architecture impacts the accuracy on normal examples. Based on the
latter approach, Metzen et al. use representations generated by inner deep neural network layers
as inputs into detectors which are augmented to the classification network [15]. By freezing the
weights of the classification network before training the detectors, this method does not affect the
classification accuracy on normal examples. However, in subsequent work, Carlini et al. showed
that these detectors don’t generalize well and lack robustness to whitebox attacks [19]. In our
work, we mitigate the generalization challenge by including an attack-independent defense setting
(discussed in Section 3.4.2).
Statistical Metrics. Second, we can use statistical metrics to design detectors. Grosse et
al. [14] study two statistical distance measures, Maximum-Mean-Discrepancy and Energy Dis-
tance, where a sample is regarded as adversarial if it is rejected by statistical testing. Ma et al.
estimate an LID value which assesses the space-filling capability of the region around an example
by measuring the distance distribution with respect to its neighbors [3]. The authors demonstrate
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that estimated LID of adversarial examples tends to be much higher than that of normal examples.
However, a challenge faced by these approaches is in developing more effective and transferable
metrics to separate clean instances from adversarial examples generated by different attacks.
Prediction Abnormality. Third, we can also resort to detecting the abnormality of input in-
stances. Meng and Chen proposed Magnet [1] which learns to approximate the manifold of normal
examples using autoencoders. Another method called Feature Squeezing [2] proposes reducing the
degree of freedom of an adversary, such as by smoothing images or minimizing their color depth.
Another recent work called Neural-network Invariant Checking (NIC) proposed leveraging the
provenance channel and the activation value distribution channel in DNNs by showing that ad-
versarial examples tend to violate either provenance invariant or value invariant [20]. However,
while these methods have improved the detection rates on blackbox attacks, they have shown very
limited success against whitebox attacks. Zhang et al. proposed a detection method based on
perturbation of saliency maps [42]. The authors find that on adding adversarial perturbations, the
saliency of the adversarial example is also perturbed compared to that of the seed image. However,
this difference between saliency may not be effective because, at test-time, we do not know the
class from which an adversarial example originated. Therefore, we do not know what its normal
saliency would look like had the example not been perturbed. Besides, explanations have also
been used by Liu et al. for a different goal of crafting adversarial examples [43]. In this paper,
we further explore the premise of using explanations, but to detect adversarial examples and based
on a fundamentally different approach. Our work was done concurrently with a similar approach
presented by Wang et al. [44]. In contrast, we have the following differentiating aspects. First, our
work offers a more detailed evaluation on whitebox attacks. Second, we provide a discussion on
the fragility of an explanations-based defense. Finally, we compare the proposed method with a
number of state-of-the-art detection systems.
2.5 Explainable machine learning
Our work utilizes recent advances in explainable machine learning. Specifically, we focus on
local explainability methods [22, 45] which explain the output of DNN models for a given input.
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For computer vision models, these techniques identify which regions in an input image are most
responsible for the prediction result. The explanation result is often termed as a saliency map [21],
or more generally, an explanation map [31]. Naturally, our defense is compatible with models that
are inherently explainable (e.g., linear models) and models that produce an explanation result along
with the prediction [46, 47]. However, we focus on local explainability methods as they build on
top of existing models. This allows us to add our adversarial detection capability to any existing
blackbox model without sacrificing its prediction power for explainability, or putting the burden of
producing explanations during classification.
Among local explanation techniques, backpropagation-based methods have gained consid-
erable attention. These can be further categorized into the following. The first is gradient-
based techniques which rely on the gradient of the neural network function to generate expla-
nations [21, 22, 33, 24, 23]. The second category is propagation-based techniques [26, 27, 23].
These techniques view the neural network as a computational graph, and generate explanations by
starting with the prediction score at the output layer and progressively redistributing it backwards
by means of propagation rules until the input layer is reached. To achieve diversity in explanation
methods, we use both gradient-based and propagation-based explanation techniques, which we




In designing our defense, we assume that the attacker has complete knowledge of the target
classifier f(·) including its architecture and parameters. This is a conservative and practical as-
sumption, consistent with prior works [20, 2, 1]. Also, depending upon whether the attacker has
knowledge of the defense, we consider two types of threat models. First, we consider blackbox
attack, where the attacker does not have any knowledge of the defense mechanism. Second, we
consider whitebox attack, where the attacker has complete knowledge of the defense mechanism
including its structure and parameters. For ExAD, this implies that the attacker has full knowledge
of the explanation techniques and detector models.
3.2 Overview of ExAD
ExAD is a framework that uses an ensemble of explanation techniques to detect adversarial
examples. The role of explanation techniques is to allow ExAD to examine the reasons for the
misclassification of adversarial examples. Our hypothesis is that the explanations of adversarial
examples being misclassified as the target class (abnormal explanations) may not be consistent
with explanations generated for correct classifications of normal examples of that class (normal
explanations). Our design relies upon the consistency of normal explanations, and their distin-
guishability from abnormal explanations. We provide an intuitive example for the distinguishabil-
ity aspect in Figure 1.1. Further examples showing the consistency aspect can be found in Figure
3.1. The first row shows five normal examples from the Coat class of FMNIST dataset. The
third row shows normal examples from the Airplane class of CIFAR-10 dataset. The fifth row
shows normal examples of class Three from MNIST dataset. The second, fourth, and sixth rows
show corresponding explanations for the preceeding row using the IG, LRP, and GBP techniques,
respectively.
While we provide such motivating examples, it is worth noting that an explanation itself may
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Figure 3.1: Similarity in normal explanations.
be incomprehensible to humans as recent work has shown neural networks to use non-robust fea-
tures (that may not align with human perception of a class) to make predictions [48]. Therefore,
even the distinguishability may not necessarily be apparent to humans. Nevertheless, we empiri-
cally show that we can train detector models to learn to distinguish between normal and abnormal
explanations.
An overview of our approach is as follows. First, we train the target model as usual on the clean
training set. Second, we use a set of diverse explanation techniques to generate explanation maps
for normal examples of each class. Third, for every class, we train a detector model corresponding
to each technique. The detector model identifies if the explanation map of an example is normal
for the classified class. We study two approaches to build the detector model: a binary classifier
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Figure 3.2: Distinguishability between normal and abnormal explanations.
approach (where we use both normal and abnormal explanations) and an anomaly detection ap-
proach (where we only use normal explanations). Whereas the former setting makes the training
and validation process simple (once we have the required data), the motivation for the latter set-
ting is to make our defense attack-independent so that it is more likely to generalize to unknown
attacks. At test time, if the explanation map of an input is classified as abnormal by any detector
model of the classified class, then we consider it to be an adversarial example.
3.3 Generation of explanations
Given a neural network classifier f(·) and an input x, the explanation of the classification of
x is represented as an explanation map denoted by h : Rd → Rd. The explanation map h(x)
encodes the relevance score of every pixel in x for the neural network’s prediction. We consider
the following explanation generation techniques towards building an ensemble of methods.
• Gradient: The gradient of the output f(x) with respect to the input x is indicative of how
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infinitesimal changes in each pixel can influence the output [21, 22]. The explanation map





• Gradient * Input (GTI): This method computes an element-wise product between the
gradient-based explanation map of Simonyan et al. [21] and the input to quantify the in-
fluence of each pixel on the prediction score [23]. Formally, the explanation map produced
by gradient * input is given by
h(x) = x ∂f
∂x
(x)
• Integrated Gradients (IG): In contrast to GTI, which performs a single computation of the
gradient at the input x, integrated gradients computes the gradients at all points along a linear
path from a baseline x̄ to x, and averages them [24]. The baseline x̄ can be defined by the
user and is generally chosen as a black image. Formally,






• Guided Backpropagation (GBP): This method is an extension of gradient-based explana-
tion with the key difference that it prevents backward flow of negative gradients through
non-linearities, such as ReLUs [25].
• Layer-wise Relevance propagation (LRP): To explain the prediction of class c, LRP [26,
27] starts with the output neuron of class c and goes backwards through the network by











Here, i and j are two neurons of consecutive layers, Rli denotes the relevance of i-th neuron
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in the l-th layer, xli represents the activation vector, and (W
l)+ji denotes the positive weight
between the two neurons. Then, to account for the bounded range of an input, we use the zB











ji − lj(W 0)+ji − hj(W 0)−ji)
R1j
where l and h are the lowest and highest allowed pixel values, respectively.
• Pattern Attribution (PA): Kindermans et al. [28] proposed patter attribution as an improve-
ment over the LRP framework. The method is analogous to the backpropagation operation
with the weights in the backward pass replaced by element-wise multiplication of weights
W l and learned patterns Al.
While we considered all six of the above-mentioned explanation techniques to include in
ExAD, we found the performance of the gradient method (h(x) = ∂f
∂x
(x)) to be unacceptable
based on evaluations on the validation sets, whereas remaining techniques performed significantly
better. Therefore, in this work, ExAD uses an ensemble of k = 5 techniques- LRP, GBP, IG, PA,
and GTI.
Figure 3.2 shows examples of normal and abnormal explanations produced by different tech-
niques used in ExAD. When a test input xt is classified by the target model f(·) as class c, each of
the k techniques produce an explanation map for this classification. In column 1, the first, third,
and fifth rows show a normal example from FMNIST, CIFAR-10, and MNIST datasets, respec-
tively. In the same column, the second, fourth, and sixth rows show an adversarial example which
is misclassified as the class represented by the normal example in the preceding row. Columns 2-6
show the corresponding explanation maps produced by the five explanation techniques. The dis-
tinguishability between explanation maps of normal and adversarial examples allows the detector
models to determine if an explanation map is normal or not. In the following section, we discuss
how a set of k detector models, one corresponding to every explanation technique, evaluate the
explanation maps towards determining if xt is an adversarial example.
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3.4 Detector models
The detector model determines if the explanation map of an input is normal or abnormal for
the classified class. We study the following two methods for building detector models.
3.4.1 Detection using a CNN-based binary classifier
First, we consider an approach of building a CNN-based binary classifier. We term this as the
CNN-based detector model and denote it as g(·). Under this setting, we refer to the defense as
ExAD-CNN. Below, we describe the training procedure for these detector models.
For every class c, we build a separate detector model gc,j(·) for each explanation technique hj .
At test-time, for an input classified as class c, the detector model gc,j(·) takes the explanation map
of the input, produced by the corresponding explanation technique hj , and classifies it as normal or
abnormal. We build this new model gc,j(·) as follows. We take every normal example xnormal from
class c, which is correctly classified by the target model f(·), and generate the explanation map
hj(xnormal) for its classification into that class. These explanation maps are considered as normal
explanations, and are labeled as negative class 0. Then, we generate a number of adversarial
examples using different adversarial attacks where the targeted class is c. Next, for each successful
adversarial example xadv, we generate the explanation map hj(xadv) for its classification as target
class c. These explanation maps are considered as abnormal explanations, and labeled as positive
class 1. Then, we train gc,j(·) on this labeled training set using a CNN-based architecture.
3.4.2 Detection based on reconstruction error
In this approach, we avoid the requirement of adversarial examples to train a detector model,
and thereby make the defense more likely to generalize on unknown attacks. Here, we propose
using reconstruction error by an autoencoder to determine if the explanation map of a test example
is normal or not. We term this as the autoencoder-based detector model. Under this setting, we
refer to the defense as ExAD-AE. Similar to ExAD-CNN setting, we consider each class and build
k autoencoder-based detector models, one corresponding to every explanation technique.
An autoencoder ae = ψ ◦ φ contains two components, an encoder and a decoder, which can be
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the proposed ExAD framework.
defined as transitions φ : Rd → Rz and ψ : Rz → Rd, respectively, where Rd is the input space
and Rz is the latent space. For class c and the j-th explanation technique, the input space for the
autoencoder aec,j in our system is formed by the set of explanations produced by hj for correctly
classified normal examples of class c. We train the autoencoder to minimize a loss function over






‖hj(x)− (ψ ◦ φ)hj(x)‖2
For a test image, the explanation map hj(x) produced by the j-th technique is given as input to
the autoencoder aec,j which generates a reconstructed image. Then, we compute a reconstruction
error:
R(hj(x)) = ‖hj(x)− (ψ ◦ φ)hj(x)‖p (3.1)
where ‖·‖p is a suitable p-norm. If the reconstruction error is above a threshold tre, we consider the
explanation map hj(x) to be abnormal. The threshold value is a hyperparameter for each detector
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model. It should be low enough to detect abnormal explanations, but sufficiently high to not falsely
flag normal explanations. We decide tre values using a validation set of normal explanations, which
are in turn derived from a validation set of normal examples. For any detector, we select the highest
tre such that its false-positive rate on the validation set is below a threshold tfp. The threshold tfp
can be chosen depending upon system requirements.
3.5 Test-time detection of adversarial examples
Figure 3.3 illustrates our overall approach, with the ExAD-CNN setting. At test-time, if an un-
known input x is being classified by the target classifier f(·) as class c, our goal is to identify if x
is a normal example of class c or an adversarial example. To this end, we take the following steps.
First, we generate k explanation maps for the classifier’s decision to classify x as class c using k ex-
planation techniques. Second, for each explanation map hj(x), we use the corresponding detector
model to determine if the explanation map is normal or abnormal. For ExAD-CNN, each detector
model directly provides a classification of normal (gc,j(hj(x))=0) or abnormal (gc,j(hj(x))=1). On
the other hand, for ExAD-AE, we obtain the reconstruction error for each explanation map hj(x)
using the corresponding autoencoder aec,j . If the reconstruction error computed by a detector
model is above its threshold, then it considers the explanation map to be abnormal. Finally, in both
settings, we aggregate the results from all the detector models. In our current implementation, we
use a simple (and strict) strategy of inferring that an input x is an adversarial example if any of the
k detector models classifies the respective explanation map as abnormal. However, this setting can
be configured based on the needs of the application, such as the false-positive and false-negative
rates that can be tolerated. In future work, we will explore more approaches to aggregate these re-




In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of ExAD. This section is organized as follows.
First, we provide details on the experiment settings in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we report the
performance of the system on normal examples. Then, in Section 4.3, we show the performance
of ExAD on blackbox attacks. Next, we investigate the generalizability of ExAD-CNN in Section
4.4. We compare the performance of our approach with three state-of-the-art detection methods in
Section 4.5. Finally, in Section 4.6, we present our evaluation on whitebox attacks.
4.1 Experimental settings
4.1.1 Environment
We implement the proposed framework using the Python libraries Keras and TensorFlow. We
conducted our experiments on a Linux server with one GPU (GeForce RTX 2080 Ti) and CPU
(Intel Xeon Silver 4116 processor).
4.1.2 Image Datasets
We evaluated the performance of our detection mechanism on three image datasets: MNIST
[34], Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST) [35] and CIFAR-10 [36]. MNIST is a well-known gray-scale
image dataset of handwritten digits from 0 to 9. FMNIST is a relatively more challenging dataset
of article images where each example is a 28x28 grayscale image associated with a label from
10 classes (shirts, sandals, etc.). Both datasets consist of 60000 examples in the training set and
10000 examples in the testing set. CIFAR-10 is a colored image dataset of tiny 32x32x3 images
used for object recognition. It comprises of 50000 training images and 10000 testing images. We
chose MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets as they are most widely used for evaluating defenses against
adversarial attacks [20, 1, 2, 19], and additionally used FMNIST as it provides more challenges for
a gray-scale dataset.
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Table 4.1: Evaluation of blackbox attacks.











CW∞ - 90.57 100% 39.11% 3.47
BIM eps:0.3 0.003 99% 99.94% 4.10
MIM eps:0.3 0.003 100% 99.99% 5.98
L2 CW2 confidence:0 0.001 100% 97.11% 4.33
L0
CW0 - 8.98 100% 38.18% 5.47






CW∞ - 90.07 100% 38.51% 0.729
BIM eps:0.3 0.004 98% 100% 4.06
MIM eps:0.3 0.004 100% 100% 5.87
L2 CW2 confidence:0 0.006 100% 96.09% 2.20
L0
CW0 - 8.95 100% 37.80% 2.88








CW∞ - 68.90 100% 26.91% 1.19
BIM eps:0.3 0.008 100% 100% 6.1
MIM eps:0.3 0.001 100% 100% 7.9
L2 CW2 confidence:0 0.005 100% 94.52% 3.86
L0
CW0 - 13.35 100% 27.09% 2.98
JSMA gamma:0.2 6.42 100% 43.35% 1.78
4.1.3 Training the Target Models
On MNIST and FMNIST datasets, we trained a CNN based target model with 54000 examples
in the training set and 6000 examples in the validation set. For CIFAR-10, we trained the CNN
based target model with 44000 examples in the training set and 6000 examples in the validation
set. Table 4.2 shows the CNN architectures, and Table 4.3 shows the hyperparameters for training
the three target models.
4.1.4 Generating Adversarial Examples
As described in Section 2.3, we generate adversarial examples using six state-of-the-art attacks-
JSMA [8], BIM [40], MIM [41], and CW0, CW2, and CW∞ variants of the CW attack [12]. For
JSMA, BIM, MIM, and CW2 attacks, we created adversarial samples using their implementations
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Table 4.2: Architecture of the image classifiers to be defended.
MNIST FMNIST CIFAR-10
Conv.ReLU 8x8x64 Conv.ReLU 3x3x32 Conv.ReLU 3x3x64
Conv.ReLU 6x6x128 Conv.ReLU 3x3x32 Conv.ReLU 3x3x128
Conv.ReLU 5x5x128 MaxPooling 2x2 AvgPooling 2x2
Softmax 10 Conv.ReLU 3x3x64 Conv.ReLU 3x3x128
Conv.ReLU 3x3x64 Conv.ReLU 3x3x256
MaxPooling 2x2 AvgPooling 2x2
Dense.ReLU 200 Conv.ReLU 3x3x256
Dense.ReLU 200 Conv.ReLU 3x3x512
Softmax 10 AvgPooling 2x2
Conv.ReLU 3x3x10
Softmax 10
Table 4.3: Training and architecture hyperparameters of the target classifiers.
Hyperparameter MNIST FMNIST CIFAR-10
Learning Rate 0.001 0.01 0.001
Optimization Method Adam SGD Adam
Batch Size 128 128 256
Epochs 50 50 50
Padding (Conv layers) Valid Valid Same
in the Cleverhans library [49]. For CW0 and CW∞ attacks, we use the implementation from the
authors [12, 50]. For our evaluation, we adopt the target-next attack setting in which the targeted
label is the class next to the ground truth class modulo the number of classes (e.g., misclassify
an input of class 4 to class 5). Table 4.1 shows a summary of our evaluation of the six blackbox
attacks.
We generate adversarial examples for two purposes. First, as discussed in section 3.4, we need
adversarial examples to derive abnormal explanations for training and validating ExAD-CNN. To
this end, we consider each class in a dataset and generate as many adversarial examples as the
number of normal examples of that class in the training and validation sets. These adversarial
examples are unevenly distributed by attack methods, due to relatively higher cost involved in con-
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ducting certain attacks. Column 5 in Table 4.1 shows the average cost (in seconds) to generate
one adversarial example for different attacks. We observe that the CW∞, CW0, and JSMA at-
tacks incur much more overhead than remaining three attacks. Therefore, we generate 80% of the
examples using BIM, MIM, and CW2 attacks, and the remaining using CW∞, CW0, and JSMA
attacks. We empirically found this distribution to be sufficient, based on performance on the vali-
dation sets. Furthermore, seed images for these adversarial examples are randomly selected from
normal examples of the source class. Note that we only utilize examples from the training (resp.,
validation) set towards training (resp., validating) ExAD; any example in the test set is considered
non-accessible for this purpose, as is standard practice.
The second purpose is to evaluate the detection rate of ExAD. To this end, for every dataset,
we generate 100 adversarial examples using each attack. This number is consistent with previous
works [20, 2] and is limited since many attacks are too expensive to execute. In this process,
we create the same number of adversarial examples for every target class to ensure a balanced
evaluation. Furthermore, seed images for adversarial examples are taken from correctly classified
examples in the test set so that the normal counterparts are unseen by the target model, and the
resulting abnormal explanations are unseen by ExAD-CNN.
In Table 4.1, column 6 shows the success rate achieved by the six blackbox attacks when ExAD
is not included as a defense. We consider an attack to be successful if the target model predicts
the targeted class. The resulting examples from such attacks are termed as successful adversar-
ial examples. We observe that most attacks are very effective against three target models. The
BIM, MIM, and CW2 attacks are particularly effective in generating high-confidence adversarial
examples as shown in column 7.
4.1.5 Training ExAD-CNN and ExAD-AE
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 show the CNN architectures and hyperparameters used for training
the CNN-based and autoencoder-based detector models, respectively. For each setting, we use the
same architecture and hyperparameters for all three datasets as the performance on the respective
validation sets was found acceptable. As discussed in Section 3.4, for each target class, we train
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Table 4.4: Architecture and hyperparameters of ExAD-CNN.
Architecture Hyperparameters




MaxPooling 2x2 Batch Size 32
Conv.ReLU 3x3x128 Epochs 50







Table 4.5: Architecture and hyperparameters of ExAD-AE.
Architecture Hyperparameters




Dense.ReLU 20 Batch Size 32
Dense.ReLU 400 Epochs 100
Dense.ReLU HxW
Softmax 2
a detector model for every explanation technique. For training and validation, while ExAD-CNN
uses both normal and abnormal explanations, ExAD-AE only uses normal explanations. To obtain
normal explanations for a class, we take all its normal examples in our training and validation sets
and generate corresponding explanations. For abnormal explanations (to be used by ExAD-CNN),
we generate explanations of the adversarial examples being classified as the target class using each
explanation technique. As discussed earlier, for this purpose, we had generated as many adversarial
examples as the number of normal examples of each class in the training and validation sets.
This provides us with balanced training and validation sets of normal and abnormal explanations.
For ExAD-CNN, we label the normal and abnormal explanations as negative and positive class,
respectively. We train the detector models on the training set, and use the validation set for tuning
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the hyperparameters. For ExAD-AE, we exclude the abnormal explanations in both training and
validation sets (so that they online consist of normal explanations). Then, we train the detector
models on the training set, and use the validation set for setting the threshold tre values. Also, for
computing the reconstruction error (equation 3.1), we empirically find it sufficient to use the L2
norm. Furthermore, we selected the threshold tre such that the false-positive rate for any detector
model is at most 0.2% on its validation set.
4.1.6 Comparison
We compare ExAD with three state-of-the-arts- MagNet [1], Feature Squeezing (FS) [2], and
LID [3]. For their implementation, we use the respective GitHub repositories. We follow in-
structions in the repositories and papers to identify optimal configurations. Feature Squeezing, in
particular, allows many configurations for its squeezers. Consistent with the author’s work, we
utilize the optimal join-detection setting with multiple squeezers. For MNIST and FMNIST, we
use the combination of a 1-bit depth squeezer with 2x2 median smoothing. For CIFAR-10, we use
a 5-bit depth squeezer with 2x2 median smoothing and 13-3-2 non-local means filter. To ensure
fair comparison, for all detection methods, we set thresholds such that the false-positive rate on
the validation set is at most 0.2% (same as ExAD). Additionally, our comparison could not include
NIC [20] as it is yet to be made open-source, and we were not successful in reproducing the
system.
4.2 Performance on normal examples
Table 4.7 shows the classification accuracy of the three target models on their test set (of normal
examples). Without ExAD, we achieve an accuracy of 99.15%, 90.68%, and 84.54% for MNIST,
FMNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively. When ExAD is included as a defense, it is possible
that a correctly classified normal example (by the target model) is misclassified as an adversarial
example, termed as a false-positive (FP). With ExAD-CNN, we obtained a false-positive rate of
0.90% on MNIST dataset, as 89 of 9915 correctly classified normal examples are classified as
adversarial. Thus, with ExAD-CNN, the accuracy of the target system is reduced only slightly to
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Table 4.6: Detection rate of ExAD on blackbox attacks.















CW∞ - 0% 100% 100% 96% 100% 92%
BIM eps:0.3 1% 100% 100% 100% 97.98% 97.98%
MIM eps:0.3 0% 100% 100% 100% 98% 99%
L2 CW2 confidence:0 0% 100% 100% 86% 100% 91%
L0 CW0 - 0% 100% 100% 86% 91% 91%






CW∞ - 0% 100% 100% 97% 100% 94%
BIM eps:0.3 2% 100% 100% 100% 97.96% 93.88%
MIM eps:0.3 0% 100% 100% 99% 99% 95%
L2 CW2 confidence:0 0% 100% 100% 85% 100% 92%
L0 CW0 - 0% 100% 100% 85% 90% 91%







CW∞ - 0% 99% 100% 84% 98% 90%
BIM eps:0.3 0% 100% 100% 100% 52% 97%
MIM eps:0.3 0% 100% 100% 100% 51% 97%
L2 CW2 confidence:0 0% 100% 100% 92% 100% 89%
L0
CW0 - 0% 98% 100% 76% 98% 91%
JSMA gamma:0.2 0% 100% 99% 95% 83% 92%
98.26%. Similarly, on FMNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, the accuracy has a minor drop to 89.70%
and 83.74%, respectively. The low false-positive rates are indicative of explanation maps of normal
examples rarely being mistaken as abnormal by the detector models. This allows us to maintain a
strict policy of classifying a test input as adversarial if even a single detector model considers its
explanation map as abnormal.
With ExAD-AE, we obtain false-positive rates of 0.62%, 0.85%, and 0.82% on the test sets of
MNIST, FMNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively. The accuracy of the target systems under
this setting is 98.54% for MNIST, 89.91% for FMNIST, and 83.85% for CIFAR-10 dataset. These
results are close to the performance of ExAD-CNN on normal examples. In the following section,
we show that both settings of ExAD can effectively detect adversarial attacks while maintaining
these low false-positive rates.
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MNIST 99.15% 99.86% 98.26% 0.90% 98.54% 0.62%
FMNIST 90.68% 97.86% 89.70% 1.08% 89.91% 0.85%
CIFAR-10 84.54% 76.64% 83.74% 0.95% 83.85% 0.82%
4.3 Evaluation on blackbox attacks
Table 4.6 shows the detection rates of our approach on the six blackbox attacks. Columns 1-4
show datasets and details of the attacks. Column 5 shows the detection rate of adversarial ex-
amples when ExAD is not included as a defense (which corresponds to the success rate achieved
by blackbox attacks on the target models). Columns 6 and 7 show the detection rates of ExAD-
CNN and ExAD-AE, respectively. Note that, except when noted explicitly, “detection rate" of a
detection method refers to its detection rate on successful adversarial examples, consistent with
previous work [2]. The remaining columns report our comparison with three state-of-the-art de-
tectors, which we will discuss in Section 4.5.
We first consider the ExAD-CNN setting. For this setting, our approach achieves consistently
high detection rates for all attacks across the three datasets. As shown in Table 4.6, for MNIST and
FMNIST datasets, we get 100% detection rates for all six attacks. For CIFAR-10 dataset, we obtain
98% detection rate for CW2 and CW0 attacks, and 100% detection rate for remaining attacks. For
the ExAD-AE setting, the detection rate of adversarial examples is again consistently high. We
achieve 100% detection rate for all six attacks on MNIST and FMNIST datasets. On CIFAR-
10 dataset, we obtain a 99% detection rate for JSMA attack. For all other attacks on CIFAR-10
dataset, the detection rate is 100%.
While we find both settings of ExAD are effective against adversarial attacks, each has its own
relative advantages and disadvantages. A benefit of ExAD-AE is that it does not rely on adversarial
examples for training or validation. This reduces the training overhead as many adversarial attacks
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Table 4.8: Detection rate of ExAD-CNN with limited attacks used in training.
Attack
Train on BIM, MIM, CW2, JSMA Train only on CW2
MNIST FMNIST CIFAR-10 MNIST FMNIST CIFAR-10
CW∞ 100% 100% 92% 99% 99% 96%
BIM 100% 100% 100% 97.98 % 96.94% 100%
MIM 100% 100% 100% 89% 86% 100%
CW2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CW0 100% 100% 92% 100% 97% 91%
JSMA 100% 100% 100% 91.49% 94.12% 87%
Table 4.9: False-positive rates obtained for MagNet [1], FS [2], and LID [3].
Dataset MagNet [1] FS [2] LID [3]
MNIST 0.50% 3.85% 4.24%
FMNIST 0.81% 3.76% 3.89%
CIFAR-10 4.25% 4.81% 5.36%
incur significant cost (Table 4.1). More importantly, being attack-independent, the performance
of ExAD-AE indicates that our approach generalizes well to unknown attacks. But, compared
to the effort required in setting the threshold tre values for ExAD-AE, it is relatively simpler to
tune the hyperparameters for ExAD-CNN. However, training the detector models in ExAD-CNN
requires adversarial examples (to derive abnormal explanations). In the following section, we
investigate the extent to which this requirement impacts the generalizability of ExAD-CNN in
detecting unknown attacks.
4.4 Generalizability of ExAD-CNN
In the generation of abnormal explanations, we notice that adversarial examples created using
attacks of the same category (L∞ or L0) produce similar explanations. We show an example of
this similarity in Figure 4.1. Rows 1 and 2 show explanation maps for adversarial examples which
were created using CW∞ and BIM attacks, respectively. Both attacks come under the L∞ category.
The adversarial examples are targeting the Pullover class and their seed images are taken from the
Trouser class of FMNIST dataset. Comparing explanation maps in row 1 and row 2 shows that
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Figure 4.1: Similarity in explanation maps across adversarial attacks.
adversarial examples created using different attacks, under the same category (L∞ in this case) can
result in similar explanation maps. This can also be observed for CIFAR-10 dataset (rows 3-4),
where we use two L0 attacks, and MNIST dataset (rows 5-6), where we again use two L∞ attacks.
Using this observation, we leave out the CW∞ and CW0 attacks, and only use adversarial
examples from other four attacks for training ExAD-CNN. We keep other training and attack pa-
rameters same as before. In Table 4.8, columns 2-4 show the new performance of ExAD-CNN. On
MNIST and FMNIST datasets, we find that ExAD-CNN effectively detects the unknown attacks.
On CIFAR-10, ExAD-CNN still achieves a good detection rate of 92% for both unknown attacks,
CW∞ and CW0. We also observe that the detection of other attacks is not affected on any dataset.
These results appear to indicate that abnormal explanations are influenced more by the original
class of the seed images and the category (norm) of the attack, rather than the attack variant in
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that category used to craft the adversarial examples. This allows ExAD-CNN to generalize well to
unknown attacks when we train on representative attacks from different categories. Furthermore,
to study the generalizability in a more restrictive case, we only train ExAD-CNN on CW2 attack.
Columns 5-7 in Table 4.8 show the performance under this scenario. For all datasets, we find the
results are good on the three CW attacks, with the lowest detection rate of 91% obtained for CW0
attack on CIFAR-10 dataset. For BIM attack, the performance remains consistently high across
datasets. However, the detection is less effective for MIM attack on MNIST and FMNIST datasets,
for which we have 89% and 86% detection rates, respectively, and for JSMA attack on CIFAR-10,
for which we obtain 87% detection rate. Overall, we see that ExAD-CNN can detect many un-
known attacks even in this restrictive case, but there is still room for improvement. For boosting
the detection in such scenarios, we can consider performing join-detection using both ExAD-CNN
and ExAD-AE (which obtained high detection rates while being attack-independent). Building
such joint-detectors to improve generalizability will be an interesting topic for future work.
4.5 Comparison
Table 4.6 shows the comparison of ExAD with three state-of-the-art adversarial detection
methods- MagNet [1], Feature Squeezing [2], and LID [3]. The false-positive rates for these
methods on the test sets are reported in Table 4.9.
MagNet. We find that MagNet’s false-positive rates on the two grayscale datasets are marginally
lower than those of ExAD-AE. However, it has much higher false-positive rate of 4.25% on
CIFAR-10 dataset. We also find its detection performance to vary depending upon the dataset
and attack-norm. MagNet uses trained autoencoders to detect adversarial examples, and to reform
them based on the differences between the manifolds of normal and adversarial examples. Mag-
Net’s denoising strategy is quite effective against L∞ attacks, for which adversarial examples tend
to have a large number of modified pixels, with a limit on the change per pixel. MagNet achieves
high detection rates (most being 100%) for L∞ attacks on both grayscale datasets. On CIFAR-10,
a colored dataset, it achieves similar performance on BIM and MIM attacks, but relatively low
detection rate of 84% on CW∞ attack. Furthermore, we observe that MagNet’s denoising mech-
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anism is not as effective on L0 attacks. These attacks make changes of high magnitude to very
few pixels, thereby making denoising difficult. This is consistent with findings by Ma et al. [20].
Similarly, we find MagNet’s performance on CW2 attack is not as good on MNIST and FMNIST
datasets. Moreover, MagNet requires training a single detector network, which is computationally
expensive. A benefit of our approach is that we use small detector models for every class, which
are much easier to train. This makes our approach more practical.
LID. We find the detection performance of LID to be consistent across attacks and datasets.
This method computes an LID value that captures the intrinsic dimensional properties of adversar-
ial regions[3]. LID achieves its highest detection for L∞ attacks on the three datasets. For most
of the other attacks, its detection was consistently above 90%. However, as shown in Table 4.9,
a downside of using LID values is the relatively higher false-positive rates on normal examples,
which impacts the reliability of its classifications.
Feature Squeezing. For Feature Squeezing, we observe that joint-detection provides fairly
consistent detection rates (Table 4.6), but introduces high false-positive rates between 3.76% to
4.81% (Table 4.9). This is natural, given the use of a single threshold across all squeezers, con-
sistent with original work [2]. Nevertheless, as reported by the authors, this can be improved by
combining multiple squeezers with different thresholds in future work. Feature Squeezing ob-
tains very high detection rates on all attacks on MNIST and FMNIST datasets. On CW2 attack, it
achieves 100% detection rate on all three datasets. However, for L∞ attacks, while it obtains de-
tection rates of above 98% on CW∞ attack, we find it less effective against BIM and MIM attacks
on CIFAR-10 dataset with a detection rate of nearly 52%. This reflects upon the generalizability
challenges in building squeezers. In contrast, our approach is more general and achieves consistent
detection and false-positive rates.
4.6 Evaluation with adaptive adversaries
In this section, we evaluate our defense, with the ExAD-CNN setting, under whitebox threat
model for an adaptive adversary. Here, we build upon recent research that shows that explanations
can be unreliable [29] and can be manipulated to produce a target explanation map [30, 31]. Below,
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LRP 99.00% 137.07 2.49
GBP 95.17% 50.15 2.64
IG 82.00% 506.75 2.81
PA 96.17% 57.74 2.55





LRP 99.17% 169.36 2.28
GBP 95.33% 51.03 2.34
IG 89.00% 510.47 2.33
PA 93.67% 57.77 2.76






0 LRP 99.00% 138.83 2.26
GBP 97.33% 51.35 2.24
IG 94.00% 484.02 3.87
PA 96.00% 66.53 3.20
GTI 95.33% 66.80 3.45
we present our approach to conduct a whitebox attack for generating an adversarial example.
4.6.1 Whitebox Attack Approach
Given a normal or seed image x ∈ Rd with correctly classified class C(x) = c by target model
f(·), we follow a two-step process towards conducting a whitebox attack. First, we use a blackbox
attack to generate an adversarial example x′ which is misclassified as C(x′) = t, where t is the
targeted class. While x′ is likely to fool f(·), it is likely to be correctly classified as an adversarial
example by the defense, which has not yet been accounted for by the attack. As a next step,
we consider a target explanation technique hj , which produces an explanation map hj(x′) that is
correctly classified as abnormal by the corresponding detector model gt,j(·). Our goal in this step
is to manipulate x′ to create a final adversarial example x′′ = x′ + δx′, such that
• The target model’s classification remains approximately constant, i.e. f(x′′) ≈ f(x′)
• The explanation map hj(x′′) is close to a target explanation map htj that is classified as
normal by gt,j(·)
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• The norm of the perturbation δx′ added is small so that it remains imperceptible.
To obtain the target explanation map htj , we randomly select a normal example xr from class t
and check if its explanation map hj(xr) is classified as normal by gt,j(·). If so, we set the target
explanation map as htj = hj(xr). Else, we repeat the process until we find such an example. This
search is fairly quick because explanation maps of normal examples of a class are very likely to be
correctly classified as normal by the detector models. Finally, we generate x′′ by optimizing the
following loss function
L = ||hj(x′′)− htj||2 + γ||f(x′′)− f(x′)||2 (4.1)
with respect to x′′ using gradient descent, such that ‖δx′‖2 < ε. The first term in the loss function
ensures that the explanation map for x′′ is close to the target map, while the second term ensures
the prediction by the target model is still the misclassified class t. The weighting of these two
terms is controlled by hyperparameter γ ∈ R+. To compute the gradient with respect to the
input Ohj(x′′), we follow the strategy by Dombrowski et al. of replacing relu with the softplus
function to circumvent the problem of vanishing second-derivative [31]. A similar strategy of
approximating relu was used by Zhang et al. [30]. After the optimization completes, we test
whether the manipulated image x′′ fools the original relu-based target model f(·) as well as our
defense.
4.6.2 Illustration of whitebox attack
Figure 4.2 shows an illustration of our whitebox attack approach, discussed in Section 4.6.
The leftmost image in the first row shows a seed image x, which is a normal example from class
Airplane of CIFAR-10 dataset. In the first step, we use CW∞ attack to add perturbations δx to x,
which results in the adversarial example x′ = x + δx. The rightmost image of row 1 shows x′.
The example x′ is misclassified as class Automobile by target model f(·). The second row shows
the explanation maps produced for x′ by the five techniques. We find that all detector models
classify these explanation maps as abnormal. We observe in row 2 that the explanation maps
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of whitebox attack.
are not consistent with the expected normal explanations of class Automobile. As an adaptive
adversary, we now intend to target an explanation technique. For this illustration, we choose to
target LRP. To this end, we randomly select an example xr from class Automobile, for which the
explanation map produced by LRP is classified as normal by the corresponding detector model.
We show xr as the first image in row 3. Its explanation map by LRP, shown as the second image in
row 2, is set as the target map htLRP . Then, we perform the optimization for the loss function 4.1
(shown in Section 4.6) using x′ and htLRP . After the optimization completes, we obtain the final
adversarial example x′′ = x′ + δx′, which is shown as the rightmost image in row 4. The bottom
row shows the explanation maps produced by the five techniques for x′′. We observe that targeting
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LRP results in the explanation map produced by LRP (first image in row 5) to be very close to
the target map. Also, the explanation maps for GBP (second image in row 5) and PA (fourth
image in row 5) are also fairly close to the target map. We find that all three of these explanation
maps are classified as normal by their respective detector models. However, we observe that the
explanation maps produced by the gradient-based techniques, i.e., IG (third image in row 5) and
GTI (rightmost image in row 5), are not as close to the target map. Both these explanation maps
are classified as abnormal by their respective detector models. Therefore, using an ensemble of
detector models corresponding to diverse explanation techniques, our defense is able to mitigate
this whitebox attack by correctly identifying x′′ as an adversarial example.
4.6.3 Evaluation of Whitebox Attack
To perform the first step of the above approach, we re-use the successful adversarial examples
X ′ created using blackbox attacks. However, while targeting integrated gradients (IG), we only
used adversarial examples from CW2 attack as we find targeting IG to incur very high cost. For
targeting remaining techniques, we use adversarial examples from all six attacks. Then, for each
adversarial example x′ ∈ X ′, we perform the second step using the optimization process described
above to obtain final adversarial examples X ′′.
Table 4.10 shows a summary of the whitebox attack. Column 3 shows the mean success rate of
the final adversarial examples in retaining the desired misclassification in the target model (when
ExAD is not included). The mean is computed over success rates obtained for different attacks
(except for IG where we only use CW2 attack). We do not show individual success rates for each
attack as they were very similar for any target technique. In Table 4.10, we observe that targeting
LRP results in the highest success rate, with least L2 distortion. However, as shown in Column
4, the average time required per example to target LRP is over 130 seconds which is quite high
compared to targeting GBP, PA, or GTI techniques.
Figure 4.3 shows the results of the whitebox attack. Each row represents the targeted expla-
nation technique. Columns 1-5 show the detection rate obtained by individual detector models
corresponding to the five explanation techniques in correctly classifying explanation maps as ab-
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Figure 4.3: Transferability of whitebox attack.
normal. Column 6 shows the overall performance by ExAD-CNN in correctly classifying the
examples as adversarial. From Figure 4.3, we make several interesting observations. First, we
notice the values along the diagonal (from top-left to bottom-right) are all very low. This is natural
as the detector model corresponding to the targeted technique is expected to correctly classify very
few explanations as abnormal. For instance, targeting GTI causes its detector model to have a
detection rate of only 19.41%. Second, we observe that targeting gradient-based techniques do not
severely impact detector models of propagation-based techniques, and vice-versa. For instance,
on targeting IG or GTI, the detector models corresponding to LRP, GBP, and PA still achieve de-
tection rates above 85%. This is consistent with the transferability findings by Zhang et al. [30].
On a different set of diverse explanation techniques, the authors showed that manipulated images
created by targeting one technique rarely produce desirable explanations (which are close to the
target map) on other techniques. Finally, we find that targeting propagation-based (resp., gradient-
based) techniques transfer well to detector models corresponding to the other propagation-based
(resp., gradient-based) techniques. For instance, targeting LRP results in the GBP-based detec-
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Figure 4.4: Transferability of whitebox attack on individual datasets.
tor model to have a detection rate of only 17.82%. The same phenomenon can be observed for
gradient-based techniques (IG and GTI). This empirically supports the need to have diversity in
the explanation methods to build robustness against adaptive attacks. As shown in Column 6 of
Figure 4.3, using an ensemble of gradient-based and propagation-based techniques, ExAD is able
to significantly limit the success rate of whitebox attacks. We find ExAD to be relatively more ro-
bust when gradient-based techniques are targeted. We achieve 99.67% and 98.94% detection rate
for IG and GTI as the target, respectively. For propagation-based techniques, the highest impact is
caused by targeting PA, which results in a detection rate of 88.61%. For the case of targeting LRP
and GBP, we obtain detection rates of 90.11% and 91.55%, respectively.
Furthermore, in Figure 4.4, each value shows the mean detection rate for adversarial exam-
ples created using different attacks (except while targeting IG technique which only uses CW2
attack) and considering all target classes. On all three datasets, we find that targeting a gradient-
based technique has relatively less impact on detector models corresponding to propagation-based
techniques. For instance, targeting GTI on MNIST causes the IG-based detector model to have a
detection rate of only 56.70% whereas detector models corresponding to LRP, GBP, and PA have
detection rates above 89%. Interestingly, on CIFAR-10 dataset, we observe that the detector mod-
els corresponding to IG and GTI are impacted by most techniques, although the impact is relatively
higher when we target either of IG or GTI. For instance, on CIFAR-10 dataset, targeting PA has a
noticeable impact on IG-based detector model as it achieves a detection rate of 60.39%, whereas
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targeting GTI results in the IG-based detector model to have a relatively lower detection rate of
50.26%.
In terms of impact on ExAD, on all three datasets, targeting gradient-based techniques (IG
and GTI) is relatively less effective. For instance, on MNIST, we obtain 100% detection rate
by our approach while targeting IG and GTI techniques. In contrast, we observe that targeting
propagation-based techniques is more effective across datasets. On MNIST dataset, the detection
rate of the defense on propagation-based techniques is nearly 89%. On CIFAR-10 dataset, targeting
PA results in the lowest detection rate of 80.67% by ExAD. On FMNIST dataset, the overall
performance is fairly consistent while targeting propagation-based techniques. The highest impact




5.1 Fragility of Explanations
In Section 4.6, we discussed the reliability of explanations in context of an adaptive adversary.
Recently, there has also been research that shows the fragility of explanations in an adversarial
context. In this section, we discuss two related scenarios and any potential impact to our defense
strategy.
5.1.1 Hiding the attack from explanations
Recently, adversarial patches [38, 51] were introduced to make adversarial examples more
practical in the physical world. This attack restricts the spatial dimensions of the perturbation,
but removes the imperceptibility constraint. However, Subramanya et al. [52] demonstrated that
we can generate adversarial patches that not only fool the prediction by the target classifier, but
also change the explanation of the modified example such that the adversarial patch is no longer
considered important. Nevertheless, here the attacker only manages to make the explanation tech-
nique focus in a region outside the adversarial patch; she does not try to make the explanation itself
appear more normal for the target class. Therefore, even though such adversarial examples may
evade the explanation mechanism, they are still likely to be correctly classified as adversarial by
our defense.
5.1.2 Changing the explanation but not the classification
Another possibility is that an attacker may add adversarial perturbations which produce exam-
ples that are classified into the same class, but have very different explanations [53]. Figure 5.1
shows an example of this attack for the case of random perturbations. The leftmost image in first
row is a normal example from the Sneaker class of FMNIST dataset. The next image in first row
shows a manipulated image created by adding random perturbations to the normal example such
that the prediction remains unchanged, and the perturbations do not exceed a threshold value of 1,
in terms of L∞ distance. The next three images are created in a similar manner but with increased
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Figure 5.1: Effect of adding random perturbations on explanations.
threshold values of 2, 4, and 8, respectively. The second row shows the corresponding explanations
produced by LRP technique. We observe that with increased noise threshold, the explanations also
become noisy. With our defense, if such explanations are classified as abnormal, then the corre-
sponding inputs would be considered adversarial (false-positive). Figure 5.2 shows that adding
random perturbations to normal examples results in a decline of the target classifier’s classification
accuracy with increasing noise threshold.
Nevertheless, we believe the impact of this attack may depend upon the nature of the applica-
tion where the defense is being used. If the perturbed examples resulting from such attacks are
not considered normal for the system, then the abnormality produced in the explanations can be
beneficial because the examples will likely be classified as adversarial. However, if an application
considers such perturbed examples as normal, such as if the norm of perturbation is within an al-
lowed threshold, then our defense could result in false-positives. For such applications, we would
require explanation techniques to be robust enough to allowed perturbations. We leave further
research towards such methods as future work.
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Figure 5.2: Impact of fragility of explanations.
5.2 Limitations
Our detection mechanism and scope of evaluation has certain limitations. First, our current
evaluation only considers the targeted attack setting for generating adversarial examples. In fu-
ture work, we will extend our evaluation to cover untargeted adversarial attacks as well. Second,
currently we do not have a unified optimization-based approach that simultaneously (and success-
fully) targets multiple explanation techniques. We attempt doing so in two ways. One approach is






+ γ||f(x′′)− f(x′)||2 (5.1)
Here, we create the target map ht using any one of the explanation techniques. However, in this
case, when the target map is created using a gradient-based technique, we did not notice any
significant change in the performance of the detector models corresponding to propagation-based
techniques, and vice-versa. The results remained consistent with our findings in Figure 4.3. One
reason behind this could be the diversity in explanation techniques due to which the target maps
required by gradient-based techniques differ substantially from those required by propagation-
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+ γ||f(x′′)− f(x′)||2 (5.2)
Here, target maps used are created using the corresponding explanation techniques. However, in
this case, we found the explanation-loss component did not reduce much during the optimization
process. Moreover, it often led to memory errors on the GPU. One reason for this is that in
the current whitebox attack framework[31], each explanation technique requires a different set of
hyperparameters (e.g., learning rate, β growth, and iterations), as shown in Table 5.1. Therefore,
we find that simultaneously attacking multiple explanation techniques is considerably difficult for
an adaptive adversary. We leave further exploration on improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of such attack to future work.
Table 5.1: Hyperparameters used in whitebox attack.
Method Iterations Learning Rate Factors
LRP 1500 10−3 2x10−4, 106
GBP 1500 10−3 1011, 106
IG 500 5x10−3 1011, 106
PA 1500 2x10−3 1011, 106
GradxInput 1500 10−3 1011, 106
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6. CONCLUSION
We proposed ExAD, a framework to detect adversarial examples using an ensemble of explana-
tion techniques. The use of explanations is motivated by the distinguishability between normal and
abnormal explanations for any target class. Furthermore, motivated by previous work on N-variant
systems, we used an ensemble of gradient-based and propagation-based explanation techniques
to introduce diversity in our defense. Experiments showed that our approach is effective against
blackbox attacks, and outperforms three state-of-the-art detectors. We also find that ExAD signif-
icantly limits the success rate of whitebox attacks. In this process, we made interesting findings
on the transferability of adaptive attacks. We acknowledge the possibility of more sophisticated
whitebox attacks in future, and hope our work will inspire further research in this direction. We
believe our proposed defense is complementary to state-of-the-art detection methods and can be
used in conjunction with them to boost the detection of adversarial attacks.
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